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Abstract: This paper aims at developing an original account of trust in the 
framework of large scale, international collective action institutions. Our research 
question focuses on the structures and mechanisms that are necessary to sustain 
the trust needed to uphold the effective operation of institutions for collective 
action. Our theoretical framework for studying trust is based on the social capital 
theory. Social capital is defined as the features of social organization, such as 
trust, networks and norms that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual 
benefit. We claim that in different sectors and contexts stakeholders encounter 
difficulties in collaborating in setting up experimental institutions for collective 
action. In order to generate more collaboration, stakeholders need to create 
structures that incite actors to find better ways to sustain trust, to integrate the 
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process of sustaining trust in the organization, and to nourish it with the precise 
normative idea behind the institutional apparatus. In the plant and biomedical 
sector, stakeholders have encountered difficulties in sustaining trust while 
experimenting with different coordination mechanisms for dealing with the 
increased appropriation of knowledge through patents. Our analysis of some 
examples from the plant and biomedical sector suggest that institutions could 
be understood as complex pragmatic connectors of trust, i.e. social matrices of 
collective action that sustain individual commitment, where routine and reflexivity 
drive trust-based coordination mechanisms in interaction with their environment.
Keywords: Biomedicine, experimental governance, institutions for collective 
action, IP coordination mechanisms, plant genetic resources, rational action 
theory, reflexivity, social capital, trust
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1. Introduction
Intellectual property (IP) rights – and in particular patents – tend to occupy a 
prominent position in many ongoing debates about so-called “grand challenges”, 
such as climate change, food security, protection of biodiversity, and global 
health. IP rights are often closely associated with these challenges and are 
regarded as one of the reasons for limited access to the fundamental products 
and services required to address these challenges. Public and private actors have 
made attempts to create collective action institutions that may assist in facilitating 
access to these essential technologies and services and in collecting IP rights; 
examples include the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources in Food 
and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) with its associated Multilateral System of Access 
and Benefit-Sharing, and the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP). These international 
collective action institutions require active and voluntary collaboration by the 
stakeholders concerned. In practice, support for some of these institutions appears 
to be limited or even in decline: empirical research has shown that a lack of trust 
may discourage stakeholders from collaborating with this type of institutions 
(Frison et al. 2011; van Zimmeren et al. 2011a). In the current paper we start off 
from the conception of “trust” as used by Hardin (2002), according to which trust 
is nothing more than an encapsulation of private interests. We examine, criticize 
and develop this conception in more detail in Section 1.1.3 focusing on the notions 
of “institutional trust” and “social trust”.
The focus and main objective of the current paper is to propose an original 
theoretical account of mechanisms for sustaining trust in the field of large scale, 
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international collective action institutions. Our main research question focuses 
on the structures and mechanisms that are necessary to sustain the trust needed to 
uphold the effective operation of institutions for collective action. We distinguish 
two stages in our analysis: first, a theoretical analysis and, second, an illustration 
of the theoretical analysis based on examples in the plant and biomedical sector 
derived from prior research (plant sector – Frison et al. 2011; biomedical sector 
– van Zimmeren 2011; van Zimmeren et al. 2011a,b). The purpose of this paper 
is not to provide a complete overview of the results of those studies. The studies 
were carried out independently and use a different methodology (plant sector – 
edited volume v. biomedical sector – survey and case studies with semi-structured 
interviews). However, both studies identified problems for collective action 
institutions in sustaining trust. This similarity triggered an interest in combining 
some of the results of the studies in a co-authored, interdisciplinary paper 
exploring the potential of a more theoretical and philosophical analysis of trust 
based on the social capital theory. In this way, we aim at adding to the literature 
related to collective action institutions by combining the insights of these two 
studies in different sectors and by further developing a theoretical account of trust 
in the framework of collective action institutions.
In the first, theoretical stage of our analysis, we question the dominant 
understanding of trust in social capital theory and propose a significant revision 
of it, based on the idea that collective action institutions are complex pragmatic 
connectors of trust, i.e. social matrices of collective action that sustain individual 
commitment (Section 1.1). The potential of such a revision lies in its capacity to 
take into account the complexity of any collective action in a non-reductionist 
(i.e. not exclusively economic) manner, also when considering the problem of 
generating trust. In this respect, we emphasize the relevance of the recognition 
that the emergence of the social capital paradigm goes along with a historical 
fact: economic liberalization. Social capital is a concept that implies a separation 
between the economic and the social spheres and a relative subordination of the 
latter to the former. The idea of social capital as entailing neoliberal principles, 
and their corollary logics of commodification, privatization, and the associated 
“legalization”, seem to be at the heart of current challenges of generating trust in 
complex collective action institutions.
In the second stage of our analysis, some examples derived from prior studies 
on IP coordination mechanisms for plant genetic resources and biomedicine 
are used to contextualize and illustrate the theoretical framework (Section 1.2). 
These examples confirm the importance of trust in collective action institutions 
suggested by this paper and show the challenges of framing governance proposals 
that facilitate the generation of trust among stakeholders. They demonstrate that 
the conceptual shift towards commodification of plant genetic resources and the 
increase of patented biomedical inventions have resulted in similar challenges 
in dealing with fragmented resources. Stakeholders in these sectors realize 
that due to the increased complexity and costs of research and development 
(R&D), collaboration between different actors, including both private and public 
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actors, has become vital. Both private and public actors have been cheering the 
phenomenon of “open innovation” whereby organizations increasingly benefit 
from the knowledge and experience proliferating outside the boundaries of 
their organizations by way of “purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge 
to accelerate internal innovation and expand the markets for external use of 
innovation” (Chesbrough et al. 2008, 2; Chesbrough 2003, 2006). Open innovation 
occurs between a wide range of – often unobvious (Piller et al. 2011) – external 
partners, such as customers, suppliers, competitors, universities, public research 
organizations, investors, intermediaries, consumer organizations, farmer’s 
organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), all of whom have 
different profiles and interests. Such knowledge flows can be facilitated through 
a wide range of formal and informal organizational modes, like in- and out-
licensing agreements, R&D alliances, consortia, networks, patent pools, open 
source, and crowdsourcing platforms. Yet, we observe problems at the level 
of stakeholders that are active on emerging markets for intangible goods often 
previously understood as “commons”. Open innovation does not always entail a 
similar “openness” and innovative attitude with regard to access to IP rights. Once 
IP rights are involved, many actors adopt a more controlling, defensive stance. In 
order to facilitate these “open” collaborations, nourishing trust is fundamental in 
each stage of the creation and evolution of these expert institutions that collect, 
develop, and relay resources, knowledge, and/or IP in a network of diverse 
stakeholders.
We would like to emphasize that the objective of the current paper is not to 
criticize the social capital theory by applying it to concrete examples dealing with 
IP coordination mechanisms, but rather to uncover a similar logic of capitalization 
that may affect collective action theory and particular governance projects. The 
paper is based on the assumption that the general commodification of knowledge 
and resources has led to “crowding-out” and “anti-commons” effects, and that a 
theoretical focus on trust within the social capital paradigm will provides us, not 
only with the conceptual means to better understand the challenges in sustaining 
institutional trust at stake in our illustrative examples, but will also lead to some 
governance recommendations in terms of experimentalism.
1.1. Stage 1: Theoretical account of collective action institutions, social 
capital and trust
Our theoretical reasoning describes a particular aspect of the motivational risks 
related to any form of collective action: the disengagement of actors due to the 
instrumental understanding of trust proposed by the commoditized approach of 
social capital. Trust tends to be understood in functionalist terms as a peculiar 
social mechanism reducing uncertainty (Luhmann 1979). In the collective action 
field, trust is regarded as a safeguard to deliver optimal outcome – meaning the 
least expensive outcome – when facing collective action dilemmas, by replacing 
a constant risk calculus with a routine cooperation. Different levels of trust exist 
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(from familiarity to civility), but their result is similar: a suspension of the judgment 
that lubricates social interactions. In this context, institutions are understood as 
trust producers, which assist in preventing defection and opportunism. But by 
observing institutions solely in function of this particular purpose, meaning 
stimulating cooperation, constitutes a reduction of their inherent complexity. By 
analyzing the concept of social capital that relies on a commodification of social 
interactions, we will show why it is essential to consider trust and institutions as 
complex social products that cannot simply be created and evaluated on the basis 
of the capitalization logic.
Social capital can be defined as features of social organization, such as networks, 
norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit 
(Putnam 1993, 35; Ostrom and Ahn 2003). The success of the social capital theory 
seems to reflect the stranglehold of a neoliberal set of beliefs on our contemporary 
socio-economic reality. After all, the development of a certain theory cannot be 
isolated from its timeframe and its social embedding. Propositions upheld by a 
particular theory are aimed at explaining specific phenomena and problems, and are, 
thus, deeply influenced by the values and norms governing that theory’s timeframe 
and place. Of course, we do not claim that all theories regarding social capital are 
an instantiation of neoliberal ideology. However, the logic of capitalization within 
social capital theory and its corollary of the reification of social connections align 
well with trends of commodification of plant genetic resources and biotechnological 
inventions. The core proposition of this reasoning is that, by separating the 
economic and the social realms, and by giving priority to the economic realm over 
the social realm, social capital theory justifies an instrumental logic and limits the 
opportunities to criticize normative choices from a social perspective.
We argue that a dual focus on power relations and social learning is 
essential in the context of the institutionalization of trust, and that most of 
the conceptualizations of social capital do not reflect that dual focus. Because 
trust is essentially a suspension of judgment (Simmel 1987; Möllering 2006), it 
implies a reflexive development of its modalities and institutional mechanisms. 
Suspension, meaning a leap into the otherness of the relation, constitutes 
the essential but complicated component of trust: without it, there is only a 
pantomime of trust. Indeed, reason is only one element in the concretization 
of trust, and social capital theory tends to overlook that. This results in a lack 
of attention regarding the interaction between power and social stakes, which 
can only be overcome by increasing reflexivity. The kind of reflexivity that we 
promote responds to needs identified by the diverse collective action disciplines 
and enables experimental governance (Dorf and Sabel 1998; Sabel and Zeitlin 
2008) as an institutional product of philosophical pragmatism (Peirce 1992; 
Dewey 1998).
1.1.1. Institutionalism and collective action
Institutionalism has emerged in the social sciences in order to better understand 
the radical bureaucratization of the modern society as observed by Max Weber 
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(1978). Initially, the institutionalist movement explained the functioning of 
institutions and their influence on society. The concept of an “institution” was then 
conceived in its formal dimension in terms of concrete organizational structures. 
However, institutionalism also clarifies the paradigmatic expansion of Rational 
Action Theory (RAT). The fundamental idea of RAT is to provide a framework that 
explains the whole spectrum of human activity on the basis of an instrumentalist 
and individualist perspective. Principles such as homo oeconomicus, self-interest 
and utility maximization, stable preferences and efficient markets entered social 
theory through the powerful and highly explanatory RAT despite (or due to) its 
reductionist nature.2 Based on the development of game theory, RAT became the 
main paradigm in collective action research, and the free riding issue revealed 
itself as its challenging core. As Mancur Olson famously stated, “unless the 
number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other 
special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” 
(Olson 1965, 2). Institutions in RAT are, thus, perceived as coercive structures of 
cooperation.
The development of “new institutionalism” relied on the combination of the 
formal and informal dimension of the social game. Two breakthrough studies – The 
New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life (March and Olsen 
1984) and The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (Williamson 1985) – focused 
on the contextual aspects of institutions and their impact on policy implementation 
or the market equilibrium. History, culture and normativity were integrated into 
the scope of the collective action reflection. By way of this contextualization, 
the neoinstitutional paradigm created important bridges between social and 
economic disciplines, and the conception of actors and their motivations became 
more complex.3 This is why new institutionalism acknowledges that a simplistic 
treatment of motivational determinants of collective action is likely to lead to 
poor policy-making. The institutional features and the extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations are closely related. Motivation crowding theory teaches us that in 
some cases, (inadequate) extrinsic motivations – such as monetary incentives – 
may undermine or “crowd out” intrinsic motivations (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 
1997; Frey and Jegen 2001). Three institutional features are essential in considering 
actual “crowding-out” or “crowding-in” effects (Frey 1997). First, to what extent 
is the institutional intervention perceived as legitimate and adequate? Second, to 
2
 Russell Hardin, one of the advocates of RAT and the famous promoter of a rationalist approach to 
trust, describes RAT as follows: “Rational choice theory is the descendant of earlier philosophical 
political economy. Its core is the effort to explain and sometimes to justify collective results of indi-
viduals acting from their own individual motivations – usually their own self-interest, but sometimes 
far more general concerns that can be included under the rubric of preferences” (Hardin 1998, 64).
3
 As we will see with respect to the social capital theory, it appeared that new institutionalism pro-
vided the leverage to integrate the individualist methodology at the core of RAT into the realm of so-
cial sciences, enabling the “translation” of purely utilitarian principles into political sciences (public 
choice theory), economics (neoclassical theory) and sociology.
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what extent is participation in the collective action institution voluntary? Third, to 
what extent is the collective action institution either supporting or restricting the 
stakeholders concerned?
Trust, norms and networks are resources that permit one to go beyond the 
collective action dilemmas. If these resources are present, they will render the best 
outcomes (i.e. the least expensive) in situations of free riding, overexploitation 
of shared resources (“tragedy of the commons”), or myopic non-cooperation 
(“prisoners’ dilemma”). Communities with an important stock of social capital, 
in other words, with intense interconnectivity between its members, are better 
equipped to generate and sustain collective action. The concept of social capital 
refers basically to three collective action issues derived from different disciplinary 
approaches. First, institutional economics invokes social capital through the 
notion of “credible commitments” in order to reduce transaction costs in contracts 
(Williamson 1993; Karpik 1996; Hardin 1999). Second, political sociology focuses 
on the notion of power within social capital (Bourdieu 1972; Fine 2001; Ishihara 
and Pascual 2008). Third, sociological and philosophical research focuses on the 
complexity of its social nature and the need for learning mechanisms in building 
common values (McNiell 2007; Quéré 2009; Six 2013). The main objective of 
all these approaches is to overcome the anti-commons and crowding-out effects 
(Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997; Frey 2001).
1.1.2. Social capital: its potential and risks
The social capital theory developed with the publication of Robert Putnam’s 
Making Democracy Work (1993). Putnam emphasizes the idea that institutional 
performance is directly linked to the social context within which formal 
governance structures operate. Putnam based his theory on his analysis of 
civic traditions in modern Italy, and he sees in associativity the core principle 
of the democratic project. Influenced by the seminal work of Elinor Ostrom 
in Governing the Commons, Putnam relies on her definition of a “successful” 
institutional arrangement as an arrangement “that [enables] individuals to 
achieve productive outcomes in situations where temptations to free-ride and 
shirk are ever present” (Ostrom 1990, 15). Putnam mobilizes the concept of 
social capital in order to crystallize the nature of social normativity that makes 
democracy work. It is considered “capital” because it is a set of resources 
with productive capacities, but it should be distinguished from human and 
physical capital. According to Putnam, social capital results in trust through 
civic networks, norms of reciprocity, and associative organizations (such as 
guilds, clubs, neighborhood or religious associations). A community that has 
inherited a substantial stock of social capital will generate more voluntary 
cooperation. 
Using this interpretation of social capital may increase our understanding of 
how cultural, social, and institutional characteristics of communities jointly affect 
their capacity to deal with collective action problems (Ostrom and Ahn 2003). 
Therefore, it is essential to understand how social capital can be built and sustained. 
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Furthermore, it seems even more vital to interrogate how such civic networks are 
created and maintained, and to question the nature of interactions between citizens 
and institutions. The capitalization of social factors is a fundamental concept of 
social capital theory that requires further thinking. Even though the potential of 
social capital theory to explain collective action issues could be considerable, we 
believe that its conceptualization has been insufficiently directed in the literature. 
In developing a theoretical account based on social capital, one should carefully 
consider the reasons and the logic behind its emergence.
Hence, an important question is whether a reductionist principle is at stake 
within the associative mechanism of the social capital theory. In Putnam’s analysis, 
the answer to this question is far from clear. Indeed, his references to James S. 
Coleman’s social capital theory (Coleman 1988) indicate that Putnam may not 
have fully grasped the risk of utilitarian reductionism. James Coleman sought to 
create a sociological paradigm based on the powerful principles of RAT (Coleman 
1988). According to Coleman, every social interaction can be explained by an 
analogy with market interactions. Human behaviors are strictly guided by their 
private interest, and the social realm is nothing less than an abstraction that results 
in the aggregation of all non-personal factors. Similar to neoclassical economy, 
decisions are taken on the basis of the organizational principle of a perfect market 
and individual choices are the modus operandi of collective action. Individual 
values and beliefs are only relevant in terms of their influence on economic 
behavior. Coleman defends a theory of social exchange, according to which only 
long-term cooperative relations between rational actors guided by their own 
private interests are capable of explaining social exchange. Consequently, the 
social system only consists of individualistic solutions to individual problems 
without consideration of the potential consequences of these actions for others. 
For Coleman, this is how social norms constitute social capital (Coleman 1988, 
101). Norms and institutions are the aggregate result of economic negotiations 
aimed at maintaining cooperation through their coercive impact. Similar to other 
forms of capital, social capital would act as a resource that enables the functioning 
of the social system through principles of interest and control. So, according to 
Coleman, social capital is an economic variable functionally defined by its control 
by the stakeholders and legitimized by the realization of their interests.
The economist Ben Fine has extensively criticized the social capital paradigm 
(Fine 2001). Fine argues that the fundamental risk of the social capital theory is 
inherent in its core assumptions. First, if social capital exists, it means that other 
forms of capital are not social. Any use of the term social capital is an implicit 
acceptance of the stance of mainstream economics, in which capital is first and 
foremost a set of asocial endowments possessed by individuals rather than, for 
example, an exploitative relation between classes and the broader underlying 
social relations that sustain them. Second, social capital theory would also require 
a separation between the social and the economic spheres. The hypothetical-
deductive epistemology of the latter would give us the key to understand and 
explain the former. According to Fine, both assumptions are wrong. Capital is 
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social by essence. Any form of capital is social to the extent that power relations 
are implied through the capital production. The denial of the fluid nature of 
capital leads to an erosion of the concept. Starting from the premise that capital 
is inherently linked to social aspects, it is important to evaluate its contextual 
impact and the implied power relations (Ishihara and Pascual 2008). Putnam’s 
social capital approach seems to focus only on the use of social interactions by 
individual actors in order to create efficient institutions. Yet, institutions are far 
more complex social constructs that require an analysis in terms of their powerful 
influence on the actors. 
1.1.3. Trust
Our questioning of social capital theory can be extended and expanded through 
the analysis of its conception of trust.4 The trust phenomenon is at the heart of the 
social bond and is often used as a common explanatory feature of the success of 
collective action. But to regard trust as a resource that is simply created through 
the free encounter of supposedly equal actors in negotiation would be, once again, 
a very strong statement relying on a very simplistic social logic. The trust concept 
at stake within the social capital paradigm appears to rely only on neoliberal 
values of community formation. 
According to Hardin, trust is nothing more than an encapsulation of private 
interests. He states that, “I trust you because I think it is in your interest to take 
my interests in the relevant matter seriously in the following sense: you value the 
continuation of our relationship, and you therefore have your own interests in 
taking my interests into account” (Hardin 2002, 2). This proposition fits well within 
the social capital paradigm. In fact, the main focus of Hardin is on trustworthiness, 
rather than on trust. One trusts someone with respect to the expected realization 
of some future event. The reason why networks are producing trust is because 
people fear retaliation by the others if they appear to be untrustworthy; hence, this 
is an issue of public recognition. Hardin claims that norms produce trust, because 
citizens know that they may pay a social cost if they do not respect them; hence, 
this is an issue of public control. Like in Coleman’s theory, trust is regarded as a 
micro-phenomenon – A trusts B to do X – that explains macro-outcomes, such as 
social norms and institutions (Coleman 1990).
Hardin, Coleman and Putnam refer to the neoliberal principle of a society as a 
free market. However, all three of them are aware of the necessity to have strong 
central institutions in order to “maintain peace” and collaboration in line with the 
principle of mutual advantage – the aggregation of individual consent – as the 
4
 Unfortunately, neither Robert Putnam nor James Coleman explores the concept of trust in great 
detail. They simply use the concept of trust and tend to mix it with social capital. To understand 
how they perceive trust, we will refer to the famous trust theory of political scientist Russell Hardin 
(2002). The reasons for integrating Hardin’s trust theory into the current discourse are twofold. First, 
the rational choice institutionalism defended by Hardin shares similarities with Putnam’s work. Sec-
ondly, Hardin refers in his work to the social capital account realized by Coleman (Hardin 1999).
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basis of law. “What seems to be evident is that individuals who are left to their 
own values commonly have strong welfarist preferences. Market economic and 
liberal political institutions allow them to pursue those values” (Hardin 2001, 6). In 
Hardin’s theory, institutions are only understood by their control and enforcement 
functions. They guarantee the respect for free conditions for interpersonal 
negotiation exclusively aimed at the realization of welfarist preferences.
Will this instrumental explanation of institutions and trust be able to do 
justice to their complexity? Probably not: trust encompasses an element of routine 
that cannot be fully explained by such a rational action approach. Several trust 
modalities cannot be based on a private interest calculus. Philip Pettit calls this the 
“cunning” of trust: whenever a trusting request is put in motion, people naturally 
tend to respond positively (Pettit 1995). Simply presenting a trustworthy attitude 
automatically raises some sort of expectation of the relationship at stake.5 We do 
not support a notion of social trust obligation, but rather an optimistic grounding 
of social trust. This fundamental trust basis is the product of informal institutions, 
norms and their underlying heterogeneous values (i.e. not only interest-based 
values). As aforementioned, to trust is a suspension of judgment that permits 
a relational commitment through a complex web of beliefs. And this intrinsic 
force, the energy produced through this kind of commitment, should be taken 
into account if we want to improve our understanding of trust problems within 
collective action institutions.
We do not claim that this routine conceptualization of trust is better than 
the RAT approach towards trust, but we start from the presumption that they 
can coexist and complement each other. The rationalist account does not allow 
a complete reflection in terms of the routine beliefs revision process. And these 
kinds of processes seem to become key features for our complex and globalized 
societies. Using the famous distinction made by Niklas Luhmann (1979) 
between “trust” (active – to trust) and “confidence” (passive – to be confident), 
the philosopher Adam Seligman explains one important issue of modernity. He 
describes a decreasing interpersonal capacity to trust our peers coupled with 
an increasing propensity to simply be confident on the functional capacities 
of institutions and the social organization (Seligman 1997). In other words, 
people tend to trust each other through the law,6
 without reporting some prior 
deliberation or inquiry. Relying on the powerful processes of rationalization 
and legalization of the social sphere, neoliberal political economy and its 
capitalist program have been able to diffuse its core set of beliefs where the 
success of one is the success of all. At the same time, they have removed the 
individual propensity to actively revise this exact set of beliefs by denying 
5
 For example, what could possibly justify the credit given to directions given by a total stranger in 
the street? What is one’s interest in giving such indications, and losing time in the process?
6
 Jean L. Cohen also claims that legalization itself, in particular the expansion of personal individual 
rights and entitlement claims, may indeed be one of the most important factors of the disintegration 
of civil society and civic capacities (Cohen 1999).
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a complex idea of the collectivity, because the collectivity only exists as a 
collection of individualities. Through the secularization of the principles of 
financial liquidity and of consumerism, capitalism has imposed the idea that 
only contractual negotiations are able to generate social trust. In doing this, 
capitalism has effectively contributed to the disintegration of civil society 
and civic capacities (Cohen 1999; Piketty 2014) and has erected barriers for a 
collectively reflexive process.
We contend that trust also reveals a routine aspect and a complex reflexive 
mechanism (Möllering 2006) at the core of the social bond, which connects 
individuality to sociality through a more optimistic notion of the abilities to interact 
and to manage the environment (Ostrom 1990; Sabel 1993). A full analysis of this 
aspect requires a reflexive concept of trustful cooperation that will automatically 
address its vulnerability issue in the process, but not as its central issue. The RAT 
paradigm seems inapt to provide an adequate understanding of social trust. Trust, 
far from resulting in the aggregation of individuals’ optimization calculations or 
in a given social attitude, constitutes not only the beginning but also the evidence 
of a reflexive process that is the basis of every social bond. Reflexivity is the 
process that enables the creation of a bond between the individual actor and his 
social context. The intrinsic limits within the strictly rational and routine aspects 
of trust could be understood as qualitative impoverishments of institutional and 
social trust. The concepts “institution” and “trust” should be understood for what 
they really are: complex social constructs that show the vividness of the social 
bond.
1.1.4. Institutional trust and pragmatism
Which governance lessons can we draw from our criticism of social capital and 
trust? In accordance with social capital theory, it is clear that the performance 
of any kind of institution is highly dependent on the democratic vividness 
of its related communities. However, gathering actors and promoting their 
connectedness in order to stimulate them to cooperate in line with their private 
interests is insufficient. The empowerment of the stakeholders should focus on an 
evaluation of the evolution of their values, because it is impossible to implement a 
radical shift in economic behavior. Institutional trust can only be achieved through 
the collective experimentation of its modalities.
Pragmatism claims that the accuracy and the efficiency of an idea or a policy 
can only be assessed on the basis of its practical effects, which suppose an inquiry 
made by a community of interest (Peirce 1992; Dewey 1998). The pragmatist turn 
has convincingly undermined the epistemic dichotomy between fact and value 
by exposing their “entanglement” (Putnam 2002). One cannot expect changes in 
individuals’ habits without motivating them to engage in a reflexive understanding 
of the proposed norm. Their contextual routines and their underlying values are 
our key concern. We promote such a pragmatist perspective not only for reasons 
related to its flexibility and its respect of social complexity, but especially in view 
of the trust conception that it conveys in the relationship between individuals 
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and institutions. In our understanding of this perspective, a potential way to 
create and to sustain trust is by working from local experimentation towards 
global implication (Dedeurwaerdere 2010). New governance projects should 
aim at a complete reflexivity by establishing institutions through a process that 
enables actors to measure the collective advantages that arise from the routine 
adjustment and the cognitive revision. In other words, institutional structures have 
an essential task in providing opportunities for the stakeholders (1) to understand 
the institution as a collective entity with particular values (Pettit 2004); (2) to 
experiment with and experience various models to optimize the functioning of the 
collective entity, and (3) to evaluate its actions, process them, learn, and adapt to 
the needs of the civic community.
The essential feature of our theoretical framework is then the idea that collective 
action institutions must be understood as complex pragmatic connectors of trust, 
i.e. social matrices of collective action that sustain individual commitment, where 
routine and reflexivity drive trust-based coordination mechanisms in interaction 
with their environment. The success of the normative stabilization by the central 
managing authority depends on its own procedures in response to constant social 
destabilization and contextual tuning, in order to be able to grasp the wealth and 
complexity of the rationalities on which trust inherently relies. Institutional trust 
can, thus, act as basis for social trust, but a reflexive connection between the two 
is mandatory. The institution needs to enable the stakeholders to understand it as 
a collective entity with particular values, assisting them in experimenting with 
different collective action models and adapting its operation to the needs of the 
civic community.
1.2. Stage 2: Illustration by two empirical studies
Our analysis of the bond between institutions and trust has shown that some 
theories focus on the vulnerability of cooperation and collective action, 
providing thus a rather skeptical account of sociality. In our view, skepticism 
about the actors’ capacities to cooperate and solve collective action problems 
results from the absorption of sociality by a rationalist logic of capitalization. 
The neoliberal evolutions with respect to IP rights has led to the disappearance, 
or perhaps even a denial by some to consider other more personal, social and 
ethical motivations in the institutional discussion. As a result, stakeholders 
become increasingly dependent on the legal framework and contracts to 
regulate their interactions. What’s really at stake is, however, their capacity 
to truly negotiate and discuss the object of their attention, i.e. trustworthy 
institutions.
As an illustration of this theoretical analysis, we present the results of two 
studies that deal with the institutionalization of IP rights. These studies clarify 
the “crowding-out” impact of the commodification logic that is occurring in the 
plant genetic resources and biomedical sector. Moreover, the studies question 
the belief that “translating” genetic resources and knowledge into marketable 
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goods, and setting up institutions to facilitate the exchange of those goods can 
solve collective action problems appropriately without building a proper trust 
basis within the governance system. Although stakeholders may have an interest 
in the well functioning of these utilitarian institutions, more may be required 
to drive voluntary collaboration. Indeed, in each of the examples described, 
trustworthy cooperation was expected to automatically emerge from the creation 
of an international treaty or contractual arrangement, relying on particular 
networks of knowledge created by interested actors. However, such social capital 
contributions were inapt to solve some collective action issues since the power of 
the capitalist interests at stake are not appropriately considered. More precisely, 
the will to create social capital by drafting an international treaty or a contractual 
arrangement is insufficient since it is based on a simple vision of the social sphere 
as a market.
These institutions may be unable to achieve an adequate level of reflexivity 
because they are regarded as risk attenuation artifacts of trust strictly understood 
as a rational phenomenon. This reflexive requirement can be ascertained through 
transparency and exchange of knowledge (Dorf and Sabel 1998; Sabel and 
Zeitlin 2008) as the best and easiest way to create and nurture both internally and 
externally a climate of trust behind the normative idea of the institution (Quéré 
2009; Six 2013). In order to deal with motivational problems flowing from the 
commodification logic, institutional arrangements that do not solely rely on the 
same logic, and that foresee space for destabilization of economic and utilitarian 
beliefs, should be used. The creation of trust between actors involved in/part 
of an institution depends, thus, on their opportunities to rely on and take into 
consideration alternative social and ethical values.
In the next sections, we first describe more generally the trend to commodify 
resources and knowledge by way of IP rights (Section 1.2.1) followed by a 
description of two illustrative examples in the sector of plant genetic resources 
(Section 1.2.2) and biomedicine (Section 1.2.3) based on prior (empirical) 
research. 
1.2.1. Commodification of resources and knowledge
Exclusive IP rights, in particular patents, are common tools to sustain the 
neoliberal market logic. Patents enable their owners to prevent others from 
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the protected inventions 
for a certain period of time and in a particular jurisdiction, when these third 
parties engage in these activities without the patent owner’s consent.7
 A variety 
of justifications for the grant of patent rights exist. The three most common 
utilitarian justifications emphasize the need to create external motivations for 
inventors to engage in innovation. The first justification focuses on the need to 
stimulate research and development (R&D) and to enable protection against free 
7
 See Article 28(1)(a) of the Agreement on Trade-related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs-Agreement).
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riding. The second justification suggests that patent owners would deserve this 
temporary, exclusive reward in exchange for their investments in innovation. It 
is presumed that without these rewards, inventors would not be inclined to make 
these investments, in particular for sectors such as the biomedical sector, where 
investments in R&D tend to be significant. The third justification is based on the 
concept of the social contract; a “contract” between the patent owner and society, 
which grants the owner a temporary exclusive right as a quid pro quo for the 
disclosure of the invention. 
In many jurisdictions, patentable subject-matter has gradually expanded and 
encompasses biological material. This expansion aligns well with Frey’s criteria 
for crowding out effects listed in Section 1.1.1. The legitimacy of the expansion 
of patentable subject-matter has been questioned widely (Van Overwalle and van 
Zimmeren 2009). There is great heterogeneity among the profiles and interests of 
stakeholders in the plant and biomedical sector. As a result, the idea of granting 
exclusive rights for biological materials is not shared by all. Yet, some may feel 
obliged to participate in the appropriation cycle at the risk of becoming excluded. 
In some areas, patent rights have become extremely diffused and fragmented 
amongst a variety of patent owners, sometimes called “patent thickets”. This 
may restrict essential access to these resources for some stakeholders. The result 
of increased appropriation through external incentives may, hence, crowd-out 
intrinsic motivations and result in a loss of the non-economic aspects of essential 
resources: the conservation of the common heritage of mankind and concerns 
about access to public health.
1.2.2. A treaty-based Ip coordination mechanism in the plant sector: the 
International Treaty on plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITpGRFA)
Typically, farmers have always developed, conserved, and widely exchanged 
various plant genetic resources, i.e. crop and forage varieties (Pistorius 1997; 
Fowler and Hodgkin 2004).8
 Until the middle of the twentieth century, public 
researchers and plant breeders continued these open patterns of use through 
trustworthy collaborations (Klose 1950). Since the 1960s, the rise of modern 
biotechnology and new national and international regulations for the control of 
biological resources has led to the “enclosure” of plant genetic resources for food 
and agriculture (PGRFA). The two major examples of enclosure of PGRFA are 
8
 “When it comes to food security, all countries share something important and fundamental. All 
depend on crops domesticated in distant lands during the Neolithic era. As crops, the maize grown 
in Africa, the wheat that blankets the Canadian prairies, and the potatoes cultivated on more than 10 
million acres in China are botanical immigrants, and old ones at that. None are native to those lands 
[…]. Directly or indirectly, therefore, the world’s six billion people depend on crops and, thus, on 
genetic resources that would not normally be found in and are not part of the indigenous flora of 
their country. The questions of farmer and breeder access to and of availability of genetic resources 
– seeds, plants, and plant parts useful in crop breeding, research, or conservation for their genetic 
attributes – are of tremendous importance” (Fowler and Hodgkin 2004, 144).
Trust and social capital in the design and evolution of institutions 165
the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) 
1991 Convention and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) (1992) 
UPOV 1991 defines so-called plant breeders’ rights (UPOV 1991 Art. 14 et 
seq) which strongly limit farmers’ use of cultivated plant varieties, and the CBD 
explicitly recognizes States’ sovereign rights to control the access to biological 
material under their jurisdiction (Art. 15). De facto it resulted in a strict bilateral, 
contractual approach in terms of access to these resources. Paradoxically, 
the general feeling of “misappropriation” through IP rights of formerly freely 
accessible material led to increased ‘public’ control of these resources through 
the CBD access and benefit-sharing mechanism. Yet this mechanism, despite its 
constructive objectives, ultimately reduced the availability of PGRFA (ten Kate 
and Laird 2000). Access to PGRFA has been limited significantly in this process, 
in particular for small farmers who remain mostly outside the ‘agro-industry 
market loop’, and who are increasingly unable to support themselves.
Therefore, facilitating access to PGRFA has become a priority for the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). FAO has created various 
institutions to safeguard wide public access and equitable benefit sharing, 
i.e. an intergovernmental Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources, and 
the ITPGRFA, with its associated Multilateral System of Access and Benefit-
Sharing (MLS). The MLS aims at contributing to the economic development of 
small entrepreneurial farmers and breeding companies in competition with large 
companies by facilitating access to a list of PGRFA. In addition, it provides for the 
sharing of benefits derived from the commercialization of products and is aimed 
at facilitating the development of improved and diverse crop varieties in order to 
answer the challenges of producing food and other crops and forages in a more 
sustainable and cost-effective manner (Frison et al. 2010).
Frison, López, and Esquinas-Alcázar collected the views of a wide variety 
of ITPGRFA stakeholders by inviting them to write a contribution to an edited 
volume (Frison et al. 2011). They provide an additional level of analysis by 
including an extensive introduction and conclusion to the book exploring the 
views of the different stakeholders. Several ‘stakeholder authors’ contend in the 
book that a growing distrust between stakeholders is one of the consequences 
of the conceptual shift towards commodification. One can also turn this around, 
arguing that stakeholders shifted from free access to commodification of PGRFA 
due to a growing distrust. However, we tend to agree with the view that the 
dialogue between stakeholders gradually got distorted since IP rights limited 
the access and availability of PGRFA, resulting in increased distrust between 
the PGRFA actors (Mooney 2011). Indeed, privatization of PGRFA disturbed 
the prior existing intense interconnectivity between stakeholders by rendering 
PGRFA exchanges increasingly complex (Aoki 2008). The increased variety 
of PGRFA stakeholders with different interests seems to explain this weakened 
interconnectivity and growing distrust. These developments severely challenged 
the functioning of the ITPGRFA, during its conception (structural challenges) and 
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during its implementation (operational challenges), resulting in a decrease of the 
collective action efficiency in the plant sector. 
Basically, IP coordination mechanisms are meant to overcome complex 
situations of fragmented IP rights. In the field of plant genetic resources, the MLS 
is based on an international treaty and, hence, operates in a rather politicized 
context. The structural design of the MLS, its terms and conditions, are established 
in the Standard Material Transfer Agreement (SMTA). A core feature of the MLS 
consists of mechanisms for the equitable and fair sharing of benefits arising from 
the commercialization of a PGRFA product covered by the ITPGRFA. A recipient 
of material from the MLS, who commercializes a product that incorporates 
material accessed from the MLS, must pay an equitable share of the benefits to a 
fund. This compulsory payment obligation is only applicable if further access to 
the material or product is restricted by the recipient, for instance through IP rights. 
Otherwise payment is voluntary.9 However, since the start of the implementation 
of the Treaty in 2007, stakeholders highlighted the difficulties that have slowed 
down the process, such as the heavy administrative burden to manage the flow of 
SMTAs, the costs related to the processing of SMTAs, the tracking obligation of 
the material, and the identification and notification of countries’ PGRFA to the 
MLS list. 
Tackling these operational challenges requires the modification of the Treaty. 
However, even relatively small policy or operational changes have to be approved 
by the Governing Body of the ITPGRFA, the Governing Body being the highest 
organ of the Treaty. Composed of country representatives from all the Contracting 
Parties, its basic function is to promote the full implementation of the Treaty. 
Decisions are generally taken by consensus. The politicized nature of the main 
decision-making body may alienate stakeholders from the actual operation of 
the mechanism. Their values may not be clearly represented within the complex 
governance scheme due to the distance between an international treaty-based 
coordination mechanisms and their day-to-day life. More detailed and extensive 
empirical research is necessary to verify the causality of these claims and to test 
whether it was actually the treaty-based structure and the politicized decision-
making process that has led to an alienation of the stakeholders and ultimately 
to a disruption of the chain of direct experimental feedbacks and a decline of 
trust. Such detailed empirical research could also contribute to proposing different 
solutions to overcome the decline of trust and to generate support for those 
solutions amongst stakeholders.
9
 Besides the mandatory payments to the benefit-sharing fund, voluntary payments can be made by 
anybody: industries, foundations, international organizations, etc. Article 13 provides that access to 
PGRFA, exchange of information, access to and transfer of technology, capacity building and the 
sharing of monetary and other benefits of commercialization are part of the benefit-sharing system of 
the MLS. Moreover, recipients are encouraged to place a sample of the product developed using MLS 
material into a collection that is part of the MLS, for research and breeding. Recipients shall also 
make available to the MLS all non-confidential information that results from research and develop-
ment carried out on the material (SMTA, Article 6.9).
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Still, by creating the prospect of an open and experimental dialogue 
amongst stakeholders, instead of the top-down principles of the Governing 
Body’s decisions, a “forumization” and a “democratization” of the ITPGRFA 
may lead to the revitalization of and by its actors, in line with its initial 
normative idea and value system. Various approaches could be adopted in 
parallel. For instance, the development of an “Informal Multi-Stakeholder 
Dialogue” organized before the next Governing Body meeting in 2015, 
allowing all PGRFA stakeholders to propose solutions to enhance the 
functioning of the MLS. This approach, welcomed by a decision of the Fifth 
Governing Body,10 would significantly contribute to the democratization of the 
PGRFA discussion. Moreover, closer collaboration with the FAO Committee 
on World Food Security (CFS), which is aimed at being the most inclusive 
international and intergovernmental platform for all stakeholders in the area of 
food security,11 could regenerate trust between different PGRFA stakeholders 
by allowing them an equal voice.
1.2.3. A contractual Ip coordination mechanism the biomedical sector: 
patent pools 
In the biomedical sector, pharmaceutical companies have traditionally used patents 
as a strategic mechanism to safeguard their R&D investments for new compounds 
and to maintain their monopoly position, enabling them to charge high prices for 
medicines. However, increasingly, academics and NGOs have been criticizing the 
use of such strategies with respect to medicines for patients in developing countries 
and the lack of R&D investments in neglected diseases. In response, important 
initiatives have been taken in setting up a variety of public-private partnerships, 
bilateral collaborations, and projects by individual pharmaceutical companies to 
deal with global health problems by increasing investments in neglected diseases. 
In parallel, the emergence of modern biotechnology has resulted in new types of 
technologies, diagnostic tools, therapies and treatments characterized by a higher 
number of components and level of complexity. Patenting strategies for these 
complex technologies have sometimes resulted in a “crowded” patent landscape. 
Even though an actual “tragedy of the anti-commons” in biomedical research 
(Hardin and Eisenberg 1998) may not yet have occurred, in some fields companies 
have encountered serious difficulties in negotiating licenses for further R&D and 
10
 In its resolution 2/2013 §7, the Governing Body “Welcomes the organization of an informal multi-
stakeholder dialogue to enhance the functioning of the Multilateral System and increase contribu-
tions to the Benefit-sharing Fund, which may provide input to the Ad Hoc Working Group”.
11
 The CFS is unique for its inclusive multi-stakeholder structure: all principal international agen-
cies are represented on the formal Advisory Group to the member governments, as well as are civil 
society organizations (CSOs), through the civil society mechanism, or CSM. The CSM includes 
small-scale family farmers, fisher folk, herders, landless, urban poor, agricultural and food work-
ers, women, youth, consumers and indigenous peoples, as well as international NGOs (Duncan and 
Barling 2012).
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the provision of health services (Merz et al. 2002; Cook-Deegan et al. 2009; Huys 
et al. 2009).
Stakeholders in the biomedical sector have shown a growing interest in 
collaboration through public-private R&D alliances in response to the needs of 
developing countries. In addition, some attempts have been made to establish 
patent coordination mechanisms, such as patent pools or clearinghouses (for more 
information, see van Zimmeren et al. 2011a), that could further facilitate such 
collaborations. Interestingly, similar coordination mechanisms have existed for a 
long time in other sectors, such as consumer electronics and telecommunications, 
and have been quite successful. Nevertheless, a survey regarding IP coordination 
mechanisms in the biomedical sector (van Zimmeren et al. 2011a,b) amongst 177 
respondents identified risks relating to trusting this type of institutions as a cause 
of concern.12 Many respondents did not have any experience with these type of 
mechanisms and expressed doubts whether they would be willing to experiment 
with and participate in such a mechanism. Apart from a group of respondents who 
indicated that they did not see the need for complex IP coordination mechanisms 
for their organization, another group of respondents was concerned about loss 
of secrecy, loss of control and loss of exclusivity. These worries seem to be in 
line with the described commodification logic, which is characterized by private 
appropriation and control.
Despite the fact that IP coordination mechanisms have not been common in the 
biomedical sector, recently two public international organizations (i.e. UNITAID 
and WIPO) and one private entity (MPEG LA) have initiated IP coordination 
mechanisms in this sector, respectively the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP), 
WIPO:Research and Librassay™ (van Zimmeren 2011; van Zimmeren et al. 
2011a). It is important to emphasize that the MPP and WIPO:Research should be 
distinguished from “traditional” pooling mechanisms, which are initiated by private 
parties and concluded on the basis of purely private contractual arrangements. The 
first example, the MPP, was established and funded as a separate legal entity in 
2009 by UNITAID. The MPP negotiates licenses with patent holders to key HIV 
12
 It is important to note that the problem of institutional trust originally had not been identified as such 
in the survey questionnaire. However, in the commentary boxes of the survey several  respondents 
qualified concerns about the complexity of IP exchange and the risks of a lack of expertise of the 
operators and management of coordination mechanisms as a trust issue. One respondent to the survey 
explained more specifically that “[n]o competent company would entrust a clearing house [a specific 
type of IP coordination mechanism] with key patents. Therefore the only use for such a mechanism 
would be to try and get value for non-core technology”. In other words, IP coordination mechanisms 
in this area would unlikely be used to exchange key patents, but may be considered with respect to 
less valuable or less important IP rights. Stakeholders also suggested that (institutional) trust may be 
sustained by employing patent and licensing experts with a high level of expertise and experience in 
the particular business and technology field (van Zimmeren et al. 2011b). During an expert workshop 
with stakeholders from the biomedical industry dedicated to testing the provisional results of the 
survey (Workshop Survey Patent Licensing in Medical Biotechnology in Europe, Leuven, February 
6, 2009), institutional trust was also frequently raised by stakeholders as a cause for concern. 
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medicines, making them available to generic companies and other manufacturers 
to produce low cost HIV treatments for use in developing countries. In 2011, 
our second example, WIPO Re:Search, was formed through the efforts of several 
major pharmaceutical companies, the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) and BIO Ventures for Global Health. WIPO Re:Search has a broader 
scope than the MPP. It provides access to IP for pharmaceutical compounds, 
technologies, know-how, and data available for research and development 
for neglected tropical diseases, tuberculosis, and malaria. Third, MPEG LA, a 
private patent pool administrator in the field of telecommunications and consumer 
electronics, established the Librassay™ diagnostics patent supermarket in 2012. 
Librassay™ is a kind of web based store offering nonexclusive, nondiscriminatory 
access to a wide range of molecular diagnostic patent rights in support of tests for 
the diagnosis of disease, patient monitoring and personalized treatment. 
The MPP, WIPO Re:Search and Librassay™ have been widely acknowledged 
as interesting experiments for their potential role in safeguarding access to 
essential health assets. However, others have also criticized these models – in 
particular NGOs such as Médecins sans Frontières – for not going far enough. 
Unfortunately, the attitude towards these models of some key patent owners has 
been quite reluctant.
During its establishment phase, the MPP encountered a certain reserve 
amongst many relevant patent owners (http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/
current-licences/). In the beginning primarily the US National Institutes of Health 
granted a license to the MPP (2010). In 2011, this public entity was followed by 
the first company to collaborate with the pool, Gilead, and in 2013 ViiV Healthcare 
(GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer, Shionogi), Roche and Bristol-Myers Squibb followed 
Gilead’s example. Some patent owners are still in negotiation with the pool, 
others have explicitly indicated that they do not wish to collaborate with the MPP 
(e.g. Johnson & Johnson). The experiences of the MPP may provide some lessons 
regarding the set-up and functioning of this type of IP coordination mechanism. 
Firstly, the governance of the pool: if one of the major stakeholders is not clearly 
represented in the governance structure, a perception of bias may arise. Moreover, 
the role of certain key individuals within the organization and their background 
and expertise may reinforce this negative perception. The MPP is an independent 
Swiss Foundation set up and funded (for the initial five years) by UNITAID.13
 The 
pool has a governance board, expert advisory group and an executive team. Most 
of the members of the governance board, advisory group and executive team are 
high-level international health professionals. The majority of these professionals 
previously worked either for NGOs in the area of access to medicines or for the 
13
 UNITAID is a rather atypical organization. Even though its name may suggest a link with the 
United Nations, UNITAID was launched in 2006 by Brazil, Chile, France, Norway and the United 
Kingdom in order to create an international drug purchase facility financed with resources that would 
be both sustainable and predictable. The funding is based on a tax on airline tickets, as this was re-
garded the most appropriate means of providing sustainable funding.
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generic industry. However, the main aim of the MPP is to negotiate licenses with 
key HIV medicines patent owners in order to sublicense generic companies and 
other manufacturers allowing them to produce low cost HIV treatments for use 
in developing countries. Yet, this essential role of patent owners does not seem to 
be represented in MPPs governance structure. There is no representation of the 
major patent owners within the governance system of the pool. This may give the 
impression that the experts responsible for the operation of the pool may not fully 
comprehend or share patent owners’ interests, values and concerns. A complete 
lack of representation of such an essential stakeholder seems a delicate issue if 
one wants to build a trust-based relationship with key patent owners. Despite 
the independent legal nature of the MPP and its laudable aims to operate in a 
transparent and accountable manner by making its statutes, by-laws, transparency 
policy and licenses publicly available, these attempts for good governance may 
not be sufficient to overcome certain negative perceptions. 
A logical follow-up to this first lesson is the experience of key personnel of the 
coordination mechanism in working in similar organizations and their expertise. 
Patent owners who have partnered with a certain organization in the past, or who 
are well aware of the expertise and skills covered by a certain organization, may 
be more willing to open up to such an organization. This may prove particularly 
effective if that organization takes a low profile, nuanced initial stance while 
strongly supporting certain shared values and objectives. This more “neutral” 
position and shared values may be important reasons why WIPO Re:Search and 
Librassay™ seem to have been encountering less opposition from private actors 
than the MPP. In particular, Librassay™ can build on over ten years of experience 
of MPEG LA in pooling patent licenses in other sectors. Despite their limited 
expertise in licensing in the biomedical sector, the partnering, matching, and 
negotiating process will be similar and MPEG LA has all the necessary skills and 
capacity on board. Moreover, both WIPO Re:Search and Librassay™ initially 
adopted a low profile approach to sense the interest of the relevant stakeholders 
in the coordination mechanism. Such a low profile approach seems to leave more 
space for experimentation and mutual consultation in order to achieve a gradual, 
reflexive establishment of trust.
1.2.4. Towards experimental governance
Food security, biodiversity and global health issues are quite complex, particularly 
because they are dynamic concepts. This dynamic nature renders not only their 
solutions, but also their definition rather problematic. The level of complexity 
might be so high that it is even difficult to simply identify the problem, which makes 
them “wicked problems”. Therefore, bottom-up collective action institutions seem 
particularly appropriate in complementing other measures for dealing with wicked 
problems: someone, somewhere, may be confronted with a particular problem 
before others observe that same issue, and should be enabled to pull the alarm. 
Similarly, if someone finds a solution to a problem, others should be enabled to 
hear about it, to experiment with it and to learn from the solution-finder. Even if 
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the underlying normative idea is authoritatively determined and hierarchically 
institutionalized, its interpretation and application should be responsive to the 
particularities of the context. Actors should be able to elaborate on the values 
underlying the institutions, and share experiences about successes or failures. 
This mechanism is the core principle of experimental governance. Experimental 
governance focuses on enabling different groups to test the implementation of a 
normative idea and to share their successes and failures (Dorf and Sabel 1998; 
Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). The governance principles proposed by social scientist 
Charles Sabel are based on a pragmatist epistemological model. It relies on an 
optimistic perspective of the actor and its reflexive construction of trust, rather 
than on a socio-skeptical perspective (Sabel 1993).
But more fundamentally, the analysis of the treaty based coordination mechanism 
(ITPGRFA) and the contract-based coordination mechanism (patent pools and 
clearinghouses in the biomedical sector) illustrate the limits of commodification 
logic. They provide some examples indicating how exclusive reliance on markets, 
where institutions are organized as top-down initiatives driven by formal or 
informal coercive principles, may undermine the non-economic sources of trust. 
More precisely, the studies demonstrate why trust sustained by such coercive 
principles becomes irrelevant when a deep discrepancy of values is prevalent. 
Instead of expecting stakeholders to surrender secrecy, control and exclusivity due to 
extrinsic and monetary incentives, the bottom-up recreation of a trustworthy expert 
collective action institution around alternative values could render the institution 
more sustainable. These alternative values would reflect common informal norms 
on biodiversity, biotechnology ethics, and a sense of openness and collaboration. 
The legitimation of such values goes beyond the rationalist explanation of trust 
formation based on notions of control and private interests.
The examples reflect the need to promote and sustain coordination mechanisms 
for IP to facilitate the confrontation with global grand challenges. Whereas this 
assertion seems to be shared widely, the main challenge lies in deciding on how 
to implement such principles. We have explored the key issue that seems to 
block the effective implementation of such models: the resilience of economic 
beliefs behind the present strategic equilibrium. Our core proposition is to 
incite actors to participate in the reflexive redefinition of trustworthy normative 
contexts built around an alternative set of food security, biodiversity protection 
and global health values. It is essential to include a wide variety of stakeholders 
in negotiating the concrete modalities in order to sustain their commitment 
and avoid exit strategies. At the same time, it is essential to emphasize their 
inscription in a large network of such commitments, and to inform them about 
failed and successful mechanisms.
2. Conclusion
Whereas both the ITPGRFA and the MPP rely on interesting and well-intentioned 
governance propositions to create and sustain, through the creation of social 
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capital, a trustworthy cooperation between stakeholders, they may not have 
been sufficiently radical in terms of destabilization of mercantile behavior. 
The normative idea behind the creation of institutional structures may promote 
positive cooperation, but if its interpretation by stakeholders in context is not 
allowed, it is unlikely that it will generate a level of trust that is appropriate for 
the effective operation of the collective action models. To sum up, for solving 
collective action problems associated with the commodification logic developed 
for decades in many sectors of human activity, we need both conceptual tools and 
regulative arrangements that do not rely on a reductionist perspective whereby 
sociality is understood exclusively as a free market of self-interested exchanges 
between stakeholders.
As we have pointed out, the main challenge for collective action institutions 
for plant genetic resources and biomedicine is to reinsert social considerations in 
domains guided by principles of profitability and return on investment. Although 
these principles may be essential in view of the viability of economic activities, 
they should also be evaluated in terms of their legitimacy and support for broader 
social values. However, by the time stakeholders finally observe the risks of the 
capitalist logic, the commodification and privatization inherent in IP coordination 
mechanisms may already have been ossified to the point that their renegotiation 
becomes extremely complicated. Even if the will to change may be present, as is 
shown by the interest in open innovation and social responsibility (van Zimmeren 
2011), the strategic equilibrium in place may not allow sufficient flexibility for 
change without raising important trust issues.
The trust issues at stake in the examples is essentially assessed as the result of 
a lack of openness to the interests and programmatic skills of stakeholders, and 
the incapacity to experiment with various models in the creation and evolution 
of these institutions. In order to create and sustain trust, stakeholders need to 
be part of the institutional game from the beginning. Mechanisms of knowledge 
exchange, innovation, and commitment to sustainability should be deployed and 
their functioning and normative program should be evaluated by the collective 
intelligence. The key issue in understanding the dynamics of an experimental 
network lies precisely in the perspective of the social mechanism of trust as a 
phenomenon that grows and improves through its reflexive practice and decreases 
through its resistance to arbitrary coercive measures.
Literature cited
Adelman, D. E. 2005. A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy. 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 20:985–1030.
Aoki, K. 2008. Seed Wars: Controversies and Cases on Plant Genetic Resources 
and Intellectual Property. Durham: Carolina Academic Press.
Bermudez, J. and E. ’t Hoen. 2010. The UNITAID Patent Pool Initiative: Bringing 
Patents Together for the Common Good. The Open AIDS Journal 4:37–40.
Bourdieu, P. 1972. Esquisse d’une Théorie de la Pratique. Paris: Seuil.
Trust and social capital in the design and evolution of institutions 173
Boyle, J. 2003. The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the 
Public Domain. Law & Contemporary Problems 66(1–2):33–74.
Braithwaite, V. and M. Levi. 1998. Trust and Governance. New York: 1 Russel 
Sage Foundation Series on Trust, Russel Sage Foundation.
Chesbrough, H. W. 2003. Open Business Models: How to Thrive in the New 
Innovation Landscape. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Chesbrough, H. W. 2006. Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and 
Profiting from Technology. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Chesbrough, H. W., W. Vanhaverbeke and J. West. 2008. Open Innovation: 
Researching a New Paradigm. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, J. 1999. Trust, Voluntary Association and Workable Democracy: The 
Contemporary American Discourse of Civil Society. In Democracy and Trust, 
ed. M. E. Warren. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 208–248.
Coleman, J. S. 1988. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. American 
Journal of Sociology 94:S95–S120.
Coleman, J. S. 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Harvard: Harvard University 
Press.
Cook-Deegan, R. M., S. Chandrasekharan and M. Angrist. 2009. The Dangers of 
Diagnostic Monopolies. Nature 458:405–406.
Dedeurwaerdere, T. 2010. The Contribution of Network Governance in Overcoming 
Frame Conflicts: Enabling Social Learning and Building Reflexive Abilities. In 
Reflexive Governance: Redefining the Public Interest in a Pluralistic World, 
eds. O. De Schutter and J. Lenoble, 179–200. Oxford: Hart Publishing Ltd.
Dewey, J. 1998. Search for the Great Community. In The Essential Dewey 
vol. I, eds. L. A. Hickman and T. M. Alexander, 293–307. Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
Dorf, M. C. and C. F. Sabel. 1998. A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism. 
Columbia Law Review 98:267–473.
Duncan, J. and D. Barling. 2012. Renewal through Participation in Global Food 
Security Governance: Implementing the International Food Security and 
Nutrition Civil Society Mechanism to the Committee on World Food Security. 
International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food 19(2):143–161.
Eisenberg, R. S. 2008. Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? 
Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research. Houston Law Review 
45:1059–1099.
Falcon, W. P. and C. Fowler. 2002. Carving up the Commons – Emergence of 
a New International Regime for Germplasm Development and Transfer. Food 
Policy 27(3):197–222.
Fine, B. 2001. Social Capital versus Social Theory: Political Economy and Social 
Science at the Turn of the Millennium. London: Routledge.
Fowler, C. and T. Hodgkin. 2004. Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture: Assessing Global Availability. Annual Review of Environment & 
Resources 29:143–179.
174 Benjamin Six et al.
Frey, B. S. and F. Oberholzer-Gee. 1997. The Cost of Price Incentives: An 
Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out. American Economic Review 
87(4):746–755.
Frey, B. S. and R. Jegen. 2001. Motivation Crowding Theory. Journal of Economic 
Surveys 15(5):589–611.
Frison, C., T. Dedeurwaerdere, and Halewood. 2010. Intellectual Property and 
Facilitated Access to Genetic Resources under the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. European Intellectual Property 
Review 32(1):1–8.
Frison, C., F. López, and J. T. Esquinas-Alcázar. 2011. Plant Genetic Resources 
And Food Security: Stakeholder Perspectives On The International Treaty On 
Plant Genetic Resources For Food And Agriculture. Washington: Taylor & 
Francis Ltd.
Hardin, R. 1998. Rational Choice Theory.In Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. 
C. Edward. London: Routledge, 64–75.
Hardin, R. 1999. Social Capital. In Competition and Cooperation: Conversations 
with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science, eds. J. E. Alt, M. Levi, 
New York: Russel Sage Foundation.
Hardin, R. 2002. Trust and Trustworthiness. New York: Foundation Series on 
Trust, Russel Sage Foundation.
Heller, M. A. and R. S. Eisenberg. 1998. Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research. Science 280:698–701.
Huys, I., N. Berthels, G. Matthijs, and G. Van Overwalle. 2009. Legal Uncertainty 
in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic Testing. Nature Biotechnology 27:903–909.
Ishihara, H. and U. Pascual. 2008. Social Capital in Community Level 
Environmental Governance: A Critique. Ecological Economics 68(5):1549–
1562.
Karpik, L. 1996. Dispositifs de Confiance et Engagements Crédibles. Contrats et 
Pratiques Contractuelles: Approches Pluridisciplinaires 38(4):527–550.
Klose, N. 1950. America’s Crop Heritage: The History of Foreign Plant 
Introduction by the Federal Government. Iowa: Iowa State College Press.
Luhmann, N. 1979. Trust and Power. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.
McNiell, D. 2007. Social Capital or Sociality? Methodological Contrast between 
Economics and Other Social Sciences. In Economics and the Social Sciences: 
Boundaries, Interaction and Integration, eds. S. Ioannides and K. Nielsen, 163–
184. North Hampton: Edward Elgar.
Möllering, G. 2006. Trust: Reason, Routine, Reflexivity. Oxford: Elsevier.
Mooney, P. 2011. International Non-Governmental Organizations. The Hundred 
Year (or So) Seed War – Seeds, Sovereignty and Civil Society – a Historical 
Perspective on the Evolution of the Law of the Seed. In Plant Genetic Resources 
and Food Security: Stakeholder Perspectives on the International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, eds. C. López Frison and 
Esquinas-Alcazar, Washington: Taylor & Francis Ltd.
Trust and social capital in the design and evolution of institutions 175
Olson, M. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostrom, E. and T. K. Ahn. 2003. Foundations of Social Capital. Critical studies in 
economics institutions series, Edward Elgar Reference Collection.
Peirce, C. S. 1992. The Fixation of Belief. In The Essential Peirce vol. I, eds. 
N. Houser and C. Kloesel, 109–123. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press.
Pettit, P. 1995. The Cunning of Trust. Philosophy and Public Affairs 24(3):202–
225.
Pettit, P. 2004. Penser en Société: Essais de Métaphysique Sociale et de 
Méthodologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Piketty, T. 2014. Le Capital au XXIème Siècle. Paris: Seuil.
Pistorius, R. 1997. Scientists, Plants and Politics: A History of the Pland Genetic 
Resources Movement. Rome: IPGRI.
Putnam, H. 2002. The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy: and Other Essays. 
Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Putnam, R. D. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Quéré, L. 2009. Les Rationalités de la Confiance. In Variations sur la Confiance: 
Concepts et Enjeux au Sein des Théories de la Gouvernance, eds. C. Lobet-
Maris, R. Lucas, and B. Six. P.I.E. Peter Lang, Brussels: Philosophie et Politique.
Sabel, C. F. 1993. Constitutional Ordering in Historical Context. In Games in 
Hierarchies and Networks: Analytical and Empirical Approaches to the Study 
of Governance Institutions, ed. F. W. Scharpf. Frankfurt: Campus/Westview.
Sabel, C. F. and J. Zeitlin. 2008. Learning from Difference: The New Architecture 
of Experimentalist Governance in the EU. European Law Journal 14(3):271–
327.
Seligman, A. 1997. The Problem of Trust. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Simmel, G. 1987. Philosophie de l’Argent. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Six, B. 2013. Confiance Réflexive et Institutionnalisme: Des Théories Libérales 
du Choix Rationnel à la Gouvernance du Fait Social Monétaire. Bruxelles: 
Peter Lang. 
ten Kate, K. and S. A. Laird. 2000. Biodiversity and Business: Coming to Terms 
with the ‘Grand Bargain’. International Affairs 76(2):241–264.
TRIPs. 1994. Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs-Agreement), Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization (Marrakesh, Morocco, 15 April 1994).
Van Overwalle, G. and E. van Zimmeren. 2009. Functions and Limits of 
Patent Law. In Facing the Limits of the Law, eds. E. Claes, W. Devroe, and 
B. Keirsbilck, 415–442. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Verlag.
van Zimmeren, E. 2011. Towards a New Patent Paradigm for the Biomedical 
Sector? Facilitating Access, Open Innovation and Social Responsibility in 
176 Benjamin Six et al.
Patent Law in the US, Europe and Japan. Phd-thesis, Leuven: University of 
Leuven, May 16, 2011.
van Zimmeren, E. et al. 2011a. Patent Pools and Clearinghouses in the Life 
Sciences. Trends in Biotechnology 29(11):569–576.
van Zimmeren, E., S. Vanneste, and G. Van Overwalle. 2011b. Patent Licensing 
in Medical Biotechnology in Europe: A Role for Collaborative Licensing 
Strategies? Leuven: Acco.
Walsh, J. P., A. Arora, and W. M. Cohen. 2001. Effects of Research Tool Patents 
and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation. In Patents in the Knowledge-based 
Economy, eds. W. M. Cohen and S. A. Merrill. Washington, DC: The National 
Academies Press.
Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press.
Williamson, O. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free 
Press.
Williamson, O. 1993. Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization. Journal 
of Law and Economics 36(1):453–486.
